Empirilegal Analysis: Commencement of a dialogue, or a battle?
Commentary on Responses to Epstein and King
Introduction
Imagine there is an injured child lying unconscious on the side of a road. Further
imagine that two adult strangers happen upon the child and both want to help. Both
understand that in order to save the child, they must communicate with one another.
Exacerbating the situation is the fact that the two strangers do not speak the same
language and the languages they speak have different origins (e.g., one is Latin-based,
and the other is symbol-based). The two must communicate with one another in order to
save the injured child, but how do they do so given the language barrier? Perhaps they
could fashion a crude system of hand signals that would get the job done without verbal
communication. This may not be the ideal way for the two adults to accomplish their
heroic goal, but given the language gap, it may be the best alternative. Some might argue
these circumstances are much like the current situation between legal and science
scholars. Both seek to understand and explain the world better, but each discipline
approaches this goal in different ways.
The purpose of this paper is to introduce the term “empirilegal analysis” through
the discussion of a recent altercation between legal and empirical scholars over what
empirical legal research should be. “Empirilegal” refers to analysis that involves
application of the principles of empirical research to any aspect of law. Aspects of law
may include the people, their behavior, the cases, court decisions, law-making, etc.. The
term “empirilegal” is meant as a substitute for the phrase “empirical legal” scholarship
which is currently used to describe this type of scholarship. As the remainder of this

paper will show, what “empirical,” or “good empirical,” means is the subject of much
controversy.
The way in which the altercation mentioned above will be examined in this paper
will be reminiscent of Michael Stubbs’ work on “discourse analysis”.1 A website devoted
to the discussion of discourse analysis working off Stubbs’ definition portrays discourse
analysis as, “concerned with language use in social contexts, and in particular with
interaction or dialogue between speakers,” (emphasis added).2 This paper addresses the
way language is used during the interaction between the involved legal and empirical
scholars. It argues that much of what turned the potential dialogue into an altercation was
a set of miscommunications based on discrepancies between the cultures of law and
science. Before beginning the argument, some relevant definitions must be addressed.
Culture is defined as, “1.a: the integrated pattern of human behavior that includes
thought, speech, action, and artifacts and depends on the human capacity for learning and
transmitting knowledge to succeeding generation; b: the customary beliefs, social forms,
and material traits of a racial, religious, or social group,”(emphasis added).3 Language is
therefore undoubtedly one of the essential elements of culture. Sometimes language, or
discourse analysis, can bring to light cultural differences when cultural clashes occur.
Such clashes can occur when professionals and scholars from different disciplines
attempt to communicate with one another about issues that involve them both. While
members of each discipline speak the same basic language as the other, the ways in
which that language is used can differ. Oftentimes the same word, especially if it is used
1

MICHAEL STUBBS, DISCOURSE ANALYSIS: THE SOCIOLINGUISTIC ANALYSIS OF NATURAL LANGUAGE
(1983).
2
3

http://bank.rug.ac.be/da/da.htm.
http://dictionary.reference.com/search?q=culture.

2

as a term of art for a particular profession, has different meanings. These different
meanings can reflect variations in the underlying culture of a discipline. Sometimes they
can result in minor embarrassment. Examples of this are when a scientific expert fails to
address a judge as “Your Honor,” or when an attorney explains to an empirical
psychologist that psychology is not really a science. Sometimes these different meanings
can result in clumsy insults that escalate into battles. The desperate scenario described in
this paper’s introduction can be likened to the situation between legal and empirical
scholars who try to communicate with one another without understanding the other
discipline’s language usage or culture. Occasionally a battle ensues because of
misunderstandings that stem from cultural unawareness, much to the demise of the
combatants’ heroic, and many times mutual, ends. This unfortunate result likelier
demonstrates a type of cultural misunderstanding rather than actual differences between
the disciplines. Before unfolding the story of one such battle, a review of the differences
and similarities between the cultures of law and science is appropriate.
To begin broadly, one author identifies some differences between law and science
as timeframe related; law evolves slowly on precedent, and science moves forward.4 In
other words, law relies on past decisions to shape the future and science relies on
innovation to help current knowledge about the world evolve. How prestige is assigned
is also related to this difference in timeframe; in law, prestige comes from respecting and
following past traditions, while in science, prestige comes from how well research
progresses knowledge into the future.5
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The assumptions upon which scholars from these two disciplines base their work
are also different. 6 Law engenders the thinking that people can operate beyond the
influence of genetics and environment by exercising free will. On the other hand, science
promotes the idea that genetics and environment, in various blends of the two, establish
how people behave.
From a functional standpoint, the frameworks upon which the disciplines are built
differ; this affects how members of the two disciplines interact with one another. The
adversarial model is the foundation on which most legal organizations function.
Scientific organizations tend to work under a more cooperative tone. Another difference
at the functional level is that law decrees what should be, and science examines what is.7
In other words, law, particularly in the litigation setting, is about two interested parties
zealously representing their clients and promoting the version of the truth that most
benefits their clients within the law. The idea is that these two adversarial versions of
truth will cancel one another out, promoting an ultimate version of the truth to be
determined by a disinterested third party (judge, magistrate, mediator). However, that
ultimate version of the truth can only be based on the information provided by interested
parties. The only facts that can be considered are facts that have been entered into
evidence by the court through those interested parties.
On the other hand, in science there is not the same vested interest in how
information is derived or shared. And, there is no limit to the avenues that can be
explored, or the “evidence” that can be used to support a conclusion. In science
conclusions about information are not presented as dichotomous results such as they are
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in law. Liable or not liable (civil), and innocent or guilty (criminal) typically comprise
the only conclusion options in an adversarial setting. In science the “final answer” is
presented in percentages, descriptions, explanations, or any combination thereof. In fact,
for science, the notion of a “final answer” is antithetical to its culture because scientific
culture promotes the assumption that knowledge and truth are constantly evolving and
cannot be absolute. Furthermore, scientific researchers are trained to account for their
biases, and to utilize techniques designed to counteract those biases. They are therefore
as disinterested as observers could be. That is not to say they are entirely objective, for
they are human, and there are typically human reasons behind why they research
particular subjects.
In scientific scholarship, researchers are trained to counteract, or account for their
biases, not construct information based on that bias. Scientists’ colleagues, journal
editors and reviewers for peer-reviewed scientific journals are also trained this way. This
is quite unlike the majority of reviewers for law journals who are law students with little,
if any, prior experience with legal scholarship. They are even less likely to have any
experience distinguishing good empirical scholarship from bad.
More specific differences between law and science involve how members of each
discipline deal with relevant information. Even though its professionals are ever mindful
of the impact legal decisions and scholarship can have on society as a whole, the law is
mostly concerned about specific outcomes for specific people8. On the other hand
science is concerned with looking at the general relationships between variables. This is
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quite different from the “case-by-case” analysis used in law. It is also antithetical to a
major principle in empirical design that touts the generalizability pitfalls of the n of 1.9
Law and science are not without similarities however. In fact, some have argued
that the two disciplines clash because they operate in the same realm of society.10 Both
disciplines share the goal of determining the best conclusion based on the acquired
information, even though the ways that information is acquired are different. When they
gather relevant information, members of both disciplines must be aware of relevant
principles and procedures. For instance, prosecutors who only have evidence obtained in
noncompliance with civil liberties protocol know they should save filing charges until the
time they have enough legally obtained evidence. Scientists follow a similar protocol by
not using data collected in violation of research ethics principles or based on a faulty
design. Thus, both prosecutors and scientists deal with information that has been
obtained in violation of important rules. Also, both kinds of professionals have to be
sufficiently aware of those rules in order to effectively accomplish their goals.
Both disciplines have guidelines that are meant to prescribe how information is
collected so that it can be used appropriately. Both disciplines take these guidelines very
seriously because not doing so can result in critical public policy violations. For instance,
a guilty party may go free to commit another crime because an attorney did not follow the
proper court protocol. At the same time, scientific research investigating the benefits of
an innovative police training method may not get funded or published because its design
fails to comply with replicability standards. These replicability standards, so critical in
9
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scientific (a.k.a., empirical) research, are at the center of the altercation mentioned earlier
in this paper. The remainder of this paper will describe the interchange while providing
some thoughts on how what could have become a fertile dialogue instead disintegrated
into a battle11.
Good Intentions
The interchange at issue began, as many do, with good intentions. However, a
key definition must be reviewed before delving into how it began. “[E]mpirical” means
the following: 1) Relying on or derived from observation or experiment: empirical
results that support a hypothesis; 2) Verifiable or provable12 by means of observation or
experiment: empirical laws (some of these laws are the focus of Epstein and King’s
article) (emphasis added).13 An excellent description of empirical reasoning can be found
in an undergraduate level textbook on social science research, “[o]ne scientist used the
following analogy to describe the role of the scientific method: Suppose we are trying to
unlock a door with a set of previously untried keys. A person reasons, ‘If this key fits the
lock, then the lock will spring when I turn the key.’”14 Similarly the scientist has a
choice of “keys” in the form of hunches and empirical techniques that are available to
any appropriately trained researcher to open up the world for scrutiny and
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measurement.15 It is this dependence on systematic logic, observation, and measurement
(i.e., empirical reasoning) that is the essential connection among scientists working on
many different problems. This is true even if they use different procedures and
measurements in their work. Furthermore, there is often more than just one “right” key
even in the same field, because each key opens a limited domain.
Rosnow and Rosenthal affirm this analogy by saying the scientific method is not
referred to as a rigid, solitary procedure by which scientists settle disputes. This is
another variation from law as a discipline. Scientific method is actually marked by
empirical reasoning which is a combination of “logic, carefully organized observation,
and measurement,”(emphasis added).16 The “carefully organized” language is crucial
and essentially refers to systematic logic, observation, and measurement. It is not enough
to go out into the world and make observations. These observations have little meaning
if they are not made in a systematic way that is therefore replicable by another researcher
who can show the relationships found did not occur just by chance.
These notions of systematic examination and replicability, standard in science, are
emphasized in the Epstein and King article as needing more attention by legal scholars
who perform empirical research. It is understandable that legal scholars have less
familiarity with these principles, and their critical role in empirical work because these
principles are not part of legal training. In fact, at the most recent Association of
American Law Schools (AALS) annual conference, themed “Empirical Scholarship:
What Should We Study and How Should We Study It?” a presenter suggested that almost
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all legal research is empirical because it studies the “real world.”17 However, the speaker
did not discuss the need for systematic study or better design in empirilegal scholarship.
The conference’s website also provided a description of the theme stating that it operated
under that notion that there is no “orthodox[y]” to empirical scholarship18. Many
scientists who have spent years studying research design, statistics, and other science
conventions, will likely beg to differ on that point.
It is important to note that research cannot do what it seeks to do wholly without
error, regardless of the discipline. Acceptance of error inevitability is another aspect of
scientific culture and is related to the anti-absolutist notion raised earlier. Scientists are
trained in techniques to reduce error as much as possible given the realities in which they
work. However, they cannot ever eliminate it altogether. Unfamiliarity with this crucial
aspect of scientific culture contributed much to the battle that erupted after Epstein and
King’s ill-received article. Closer review of their article, and the resulting responses, will
demonstrate how this happened.
In their article, Epstein and King exhibit the empirical notion of systematic
examination by methodically reviewing law review articles with the term “empirical” in
their titles. Epstein and King use this data to demonstrate their basic conclusion that
legal scholars are ‘deeply flawed”19 in their efforts to conduct empirical legal (a.k.a.
“empirilegal”) research. They recommend that legal scholars seek guidance from social
scientists on how to apply methodological rules and reform legal education. It is
17
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important to note that while legal education reform is a popular, and enticing subject, it
reaches beyond the scope of this paper. Thus, empirical rule application will remain the
focus.
Epstein and King begin their article by acknowledging that legal scholars have
been using empirical methodology for as long as they have been researching the law.
However, they note that these scholars have been doing so without complying with
several of the rules of inference that are an essential part of empirical methodology.
Epstein and King further argue that legal scholars have not availed themselves of the
important lessons learned by scientists over the last hundred years or so.20 Empirical
methodology underwent a revolution during this time.21 One of the lessons Epstein and
King mention is the importance of having journal articles that are earmarked solely for
the discussion of empirical methodology. This kind of inclusion is widespread in the
journals of other established academic fields but is hard to find in law reviews. Epstein
and King caution that this lack leads consumers of legal scholarship to learn information
that is less precise about the empirical world than is implied by affirmative, yet not
overconfident, conclusions. A related problem involves legal scholars’ use of the term
“empirical.” Such use can lead to an inappropriate effect on how judges, legislators, and
administrators decide public policy.22 They add that law research claiming to be
empirical that does not follow the rules of inference will not typically follow in the
footsteps of its scientific counterpart in striving for reliability and validity.
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After explaining the empirical rules of inference as they would be applied to
subjects examined in legal scholarship, Epstein and King are careful to note that their
intentions are not to berate professors of law or the scholarship they produce. They claim
their intention is to contribute to reducing current “problems in the literature.”23 They
also make a point to say that because professors of law are in the habit of drawing
inferences about the “real world” they have a “strong interest in learning how to conduct
empirical research properly,”24 (emphasis added). Epstein and King see their function as
enabling law professors to “contribute to a credible, valid, common, and ultimately more
valuable research enterprise,” by setting out the rules of inference with their
accompanying guidelines in an effort to improve legal scholarship quality.25 As will be
discussed in more detail later, it may come as no surprise that some legal scholars did not
deem themselves as in need of such enabling.
To their end, Epstein and King made the following recommendations26:
1. Offer courses in empirical research for law school students;
2. Enhance opportunities for faculty to conduct high quality empirical
research—and then disseminate it quickly;
3. Encourage employers to hire students with empirical training;
4. Move to an alternative model of scholarly journal management; and
5. Develop standards for data archiving.
It would appear that Epstein and King have the best of intentions to provide legal
scholars with the rules of inference in an effort to improve legal scholarship. Epstein and
King even go so far as to rave about the importance of law as a field, which they argue
renders it in need of a methodology subfield.27 They state that their intentions are to
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make it so that legal scholars are able to tell the difference between good and bad
empirical work. This is a need that some legal scholars and judges have identified as
prevalent.28 However, based on the responses to Epstein and King’s well-intentioned
piece, it would appear that their delivery had more impact than their message.
Practice What You Preach: Response by Cross et al.
Cross et al. defend legal scholarship and criticize Epstein and King for not abiding
by the very rules they use to criticize legal scholarship. Their major objection appears to
be that Epstein and King’s comments are too personal. For example, they suggest that
the authors Epstein and King criticize should have been coded and not explicitly named.
The authors of this response begin by commending Epstein and King on their
suggestions and acknowledging the value of the detailed instruction in empirical
methodology.29 While this response initially demonstrates gratitude to Epstein and King
for their instruction, the remainder of the response details what is viewed as an
“unremitting and excessive attack on the current state of empirical legal research
methodology.”30 The authors do not say these “attacks” are completely unwarranted but
they identify some of them as failing to accomplish what they intend. Cross et al. turn
Epstein and King’s methodology around on them. They charge that, “their assault on
legal scholarship violates many of their own rules of inference. These violations degrade
their analyses and erode confidence in their conclusions and recommendations. In the
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end, despite its promising thesis, their article becomes an exemplar of how descriptive
research should not be conducted.”31
The Cross et al. response becomes a good example of what can happen when
scholars, admirable in their own fields, attempt to converse about another’s trade without
understanding the other’s culture and language. Misunderstandings can happen and
feathers can get ruffled. Even though the Epstein and King piece is a shining example of
how not to address legal scholars, Cross et al.’s invective is not typical in scientific
scholarship. That is not to say the sentiment behind their response is not typically
encountered. In fact, scientific scholars criticize one another’s work all the time, but the
language is usually more diplomatic. One could easily argue that some of the points
raised in the Epstein and King piece are far from diplomatic. The best supporting
example is when they say that empirilegal scholarship is “deeply flawed.” In fact, Cross
et al. take Epstein and King to task for it. This justifies why it is so crucial to understand
the culture of your intended audience relative to how it might perceive your message.
The language in science is not often acerbic, even when heavy criticisms are
levied. In law, however, persuasion and advocacy are part of everything lawyers say, do,
and write. Additionally, expressing one’s points in an absolutist, overconfident manner is
an integral part of legal culture.32 These aspects of legal culture are clearly antithetical to
those in scientific culture and clearly contribute to the culture clash we see unfolding.
Cross et al. seem to be less concerned with Epstein and King’s point of sharing the
information one would expect legal scholars to want. It would appear that Cross et al.
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have instead perceived Epstein and King’s message as a derision of legal scholars for
even trying to perform empirical work.
Cross et al. then take Epstein and King to task for each point of empirical
procedure they identify as crucial in their article. However, they make the same mistake
identified by Epstein and King when they seem to expect the procedure and results to be
entirely without flaw. This illustrates further the culture clash between law and science
that was first raised earlier in this paper. In law there are such standards as “beyond a
reasonable doubt,” and dichotomies such as “guilty” and “not guilty.” In science, one
cannot even say with total confidence that the sun will rise in the morning as it is
antithetical to scientific culture to know something so completely. In science error
cannot be eliminated and overconfident statements of fact are heavily frowned upon.
However, researchers can reduce error by complying with the methodological rules
Epstein and King suggest. Furthermore, when a scientist offers conclusions, they offer
them using more tentative, anti-absolutist language than would a lawyer.
While Cross et al. agree that knowledge in empirical methodology is valuable,
they appear to take personal exception to the delivery of this message. They agree that
“proof by anecdote”33 is exactly the kind of issue legal scholars are trying to address.
However, they do not appear to recognize the problems with how legal scholars seek to
rectify this issue. Instead, they seem to bristle at the idea of making changes to legal
education. This may be the result of a fear that it may lose its uniqueness among
graduate programs. This perception is derived from Cross et al.’s statement that, “[t]he
basic thrust of [Epstein and King’s] proposal is to make the system more like the
convention in social science and many other disciplines.[…] No amount of trashing
33
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legal scholarship for inferential errors can make the case for such a shift without a
comparable evaluation of the social science scholarship that they prefer,” (emphasis
added).34 One could argue that this would be a fair challenge if there were more social
scientists attempting to perform legal research and publishing their work as legal
research. Cross et al. could have made this a more effective argument had they identified
empirical scholarship specifically claiming to perform legal research without following
the rules of legal research. They could have then likewise demonstrated the relevant
flaws so that social scientists could be better informed about the work they are trying to
accomplish.
Cross et al. do admit to some of Epstein and King’s assertions when they state,
“[w]e are mindful of shortcomings in the current state of legal research35 and suspect that
many of Epstein and King’s proposals on this point might well lead to an
improvement.”36 However, they go on to say that, “they certainly have not established
the necessary inferences to support their proposal, and they ignore the considerable
literature criticizing aspects of the peer review process. Indeed, the peer-review process
itself looks insupportable by the very rules of inference established by Epstein and
King.”37 Cross et al. seem to miss the point of what Epstein and King are saying.
Epstein and King don’t appear to be touting the virtues of peer review as unassailable, but
they merely identify peer review as better than subordinate review. Conventional
wisdom dictates that it is better to have a multiple seasoned veterans review a scholar’s
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work, than a single unseasoned subordinate. This is especially true when that work
informs policy that shapes society and its laws.
Cross et al. close their vociferous response by stating that their essential point is
that Epstein and King should practice what they preach. They say, ”[w]e can only hope
that their deeply flawed effort to achieve their goal will neither diminish nor deflect
attention from a worthwhile and important thesis.”38 Finally, what Cross et al. may have
intended as thought-provoking in closing comes across as a spiteful warning, “[t]wo of us
serve as peer reviewers for social science journals and, had their article been submitted to
us for review, we would have suggested that the authors revise and resubmit.”39 One
feels compelled to consider the authors’ intended audience as made up primarily of
scholars writing empirilegal scholarship. Thus, submission to a social science journal
would not have accomplished much. This is a result Epstein and King are sure to have
considered when formulating their paper.
It would appear that Cross et al., and perhaps the authors of the other responses,
have not recognized an important cultural difference in their response to Epstein and
King. This difference is mainly that legal culture mandates a “fight-and-win” mentality.
On the other hand, scientific culture mandates a “co-discovery of knowledge” mentality.
Of course competition exists in science, and among its scholars, but not in the same way
it exists for legal professionals and scholars. Cross et al. perform well in their roles as
persuaders and advocates of the legal scholarship they and their colleagues perform. In
doing so they appear to be engaging in a kind of battle with well-intended, yet
unwelcome scientists. Cross et al., however, are not the only warriors in this ill-
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construed battle. Another less-than-welcoming response was published at the same time
by Goldsmith and Vermeule.
It’s All Statistics to Us: Goldsmith & Vermeule.
Goldsmith and Vermeule reflect some of the points made by Cross et al., but they
do so more vehemently.40 Like Cross et al., they include in their vehemence an
acknowledgement of the importance of the subject matter at the foundation of Epstein
and King’s message. They say, “[l]awyer’s and judges, and indeed educated people
generally, would benefit from a basic knowledge of statistical methods. Putting aside the
opportunity costs of statistical training… greater attention to the rules of inference would,
when appropriate, improve legal scholarship.”41 Goldsmith and Vermeule’s
misunderstanding of empiricism may be shared by some of the law schools that do not
find the opportunity costs so intimidating. These schools offer courses designed to teach
law students how to understand statistics, especially in the legal context.42 Additionally,
one could easily argue that there is no more appropriate a circumstance requiring the use
of empiricism’s rules of inference than when scholarship labels itself as “empirical”, or as
using “empirical analysis.” As acknowledged earlier in this paper, this was the case with
all of the articles Epstein and King used in their study. In fact, a search using the term
“empirical” in law review articles’ titles is the very methodology used by Epstein and
King to collect their data. Despite Cross et al.’s claims of irreplicability, this technique
does not seem difficult for anyone with access to Lexis-Nexis or Westlaw.

40

Jack Goldsmith & Adrian Vermeule, Empirical Research and the Goals of Legal Scholarship: Empirical
Methodology and Legal Scholarship, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 153 (2002).
41
Id. at 153.
42
A few examples of these law schools are: George Mason University School of Law, Duke University
School of Law, and University of Michigan School of Law.

17

Goldsmith and Vermeule make a less-than-generous comparison between law and
science when they disclaim science’s ability to make change as a result of its findings:
[a]t its best, persuasive legal scholarship displays a power to elucidate the logic of
doctrinal practices in enlightening ways, to engage audiences, and to motivate legal and
social change—a power usually lacking in the pallid output of statistical empiricism.43
One has merely to consider a few of the multitude of cases that have made changes in
society reflecting the coordination of scientific and legal tools: Oregon v. Muller44,
Brown v. Board of Education45, Dothard v. Rawlinson46, and Daubert v. Merrell Dow
Pharmaceuticals47. Furthermore, one could also consider the use of science by
legislators who rely on its informative and impactful nature to create the laws lawyers are
charged with learning, and courts are charged with interpreting.
Even though Goldsmith and Vermeule do a good job of defending legal
scholarship and describing its value, they insist their point is not to, “defend an
adversarial picture of legal scholarship.”48 This is an interesting point given that this
nature may be behind the cultural discrepancy at the heart of this unfolding conflict.
They explain that while lawyers certainly color facts and law to comport with their
outcome preferences, the end result is a “fully rounded picture of the truth.” They go on
to argue that the same thing happens in legal scholarship by saying, “[i]n both the
academic and courtroom settings, there is a system-level justification for the competitive
production of evidence that Epstein and King’s simple critique assumes away.”49 This
43
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argument is a fair one, but it does not take into account why empirical analysis does not
consider competition. This author posits that it is because empirical researchers are
generally trained to understand information as without sides. In fact, there may be some
circumstances where scientists encourage others to examine the same domain as they
examined so that their conclusions may be validated (that is the hope of course).
Goldsmith and Vermeule exhibit a tendency to use statistics as a proxy for
empiricism. Their perspective includes quantitative analysis, but not qualitative analysis
which can provide a great deal of rich information, even when the information is acquired
in a systematic way. This means researchers are trained to be objective observers. If the
research design does not call for the objective checks inherent to quantitative types of
empirical research, then researchers are trained to account for their subjectivity by
making it explicit in their reports. This is a commonly accepted practice in qualitative
research and is referred to as “reflexivity.”50
An interesting point to make is that Goldsmith and Vermeule’s comment on law’s
adversarial nature is a reference to legal culture, but merely a reference. Epstein and
King also make a reference to culture when they say that legal scholarship applies the
“rules” of persuasion and advocacy instead of the rules of inference.51 On their own own,
however, these brief references are insufficient to adequately address what is causing the
battle we see unfolding in responses to Epstein and King.
Ultimately, even though Goldsmith and Vermeule admit “lawyers and judges…
would benefit from a basic knowledge of statistical methods,52” they seem to take Epstein
and King’s comments as an indictment of all legal scholarship, not just legal scholarship
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purporting to be “empirical”. To be fair, Epstein and King do take issue with the review
process in legal journals which applies to virtually all legal scholarship. However, if one
reads their introduction, and looks at the data they describe, one will likely recognize that
they are remarking primarily on legal scholarship labeling itself as “empirical”.
All Right, Let’s All Just Settle Down: Revesz53
Even though Revesz does much to defend empirical legal scholarship, he admits
that, “it may well be the case that empirical legal scholarship is in bad shape. But how do
we know that social scientists do not engage in the same, or other, pitfalls when they
write about law related subjects?”54 That would be a fair enough argument if the subject
at issue were not the empirical research legal scholars do. Like Goldsmith and
Vermeule, Revesz seems to miss the point about matching scholarship label with the
appropriate rules. In other words, if the work is going to be called “empirical”, then it
should follow the principles around which empirical work is supposed to be performed.
Scientific scholars who want to be published in scientific journals generally know that
they must follow these rules, or risk not having their work accepted for publication, or
accepted into the scientific community.
Like attorneys who must be licensed in a particular jurisdiction to so much as
provide legal advice in that jurisdiction, perhaps scientists merely want to maintain the
standards of their discipline. One might expect this sense of professional integrity to
resonate well with lawyers who are members of a profession as esoteric as it is powerful
and prestigious. The three responses reviewed in this paper betray no such empathy.
Additionally, this mismatch between espoused technique and compliance with technique
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principles used by legal scholars flies in the face of a legal culture tenet that is taught in
professional responsibility courses at law schools nationwide. This tenet holds that the
“appearance of impropriety” is to be avoided at all times by lawyers. Law students are
taught that even any appearance of improper behavior on behalf of an attorney can have
disastrous consequences. An attorney should not even appear to be doing anything
untoward, or that could be misconstrued as untoward. One would thus expect legal
scholars, who are attorneys regardless of licensure status, to be quite careful about how
they hold themselves, and their scholarship, out to the world.
Most importantly, Revesz indicates approval of Epstein and King’s position that
an interdisciplinary dialogue would be desirable. He further approves of their contention
that legal scholars would surely reap the rewards of such a dialogue. He insists, however,
that Epstein and King are mistaken in their belief that the rewards would be only oneway. One could hardly disagree with that statement given Epstein and King’s praise of
the law field described earlier in this paper.
Revesz implies that legal scholars do not exist in a world apart from their
equivalents in social science. He also insists that institutions embracing both types of
scholars exist and are doing well. However, he provides limited information about a
handful of relevant conferences and meetings, and scholars who have “created vigorous
and successful institutions.” 55 Revesz further asserts that legal scholarship has been
gradually integrated with other parts of the academy over the last thirty or so years with
some information to support this assertion. However, it does not seem that this
information adequately addresses the extensive involvement between the two fields that
Epstein and King encourage.
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Revesz further notes that, “there are a number of interdisciplinary peer-reviewed
journals in which both legal and social science academics publish their work. Epstein
and King appear to have simply missed what may be the most important intellectual
development in legal scholarship in the last couple of decades: its gradual integration
with other parts of the academy.”56 This author would argue that there has indeed been
some integration, but Revesz’ comment misses Epstein and King’s point that espoused
methodology should match actual methodology principles, regardless of what type of
scholar is reviewing what for which journal.
Revesz concludes with acquiescence that student editors of law reviews are likely
not sufficiently trained to determine the value of empirical studies. This is true even if
they can usually determine how important the examined question is. He firmly asserts,
however, that:
empirical legal scholarship has a great deal to contribute to the
understanding of law and legal institutions, and social scientists would
benefit from paying close attention to the methodological innovations
performed by legal scholars. Because of their flawed methodology and
unwarranted criticisms and exaggerations, Epstein and King have missed
an important opportunity to examine what legal and social science
empirical scholarship can learn from one another.57
This author finds the comment about “methodological innovations performed by
legal scholars” particularly compelling. Law is a fascinating field that may inadvertently
be inhospitable to scientific inquiry. However, if anyone is going to be able to break new
ground in how the law is examined empirically, it will likely be legal scholars because
they undoubtedly understand the law field better than scientists.58 To be sure, in order for
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the empirilegal work legal scholars conduct to improve, it is important that they abide by
the principles forming the foundation of empiricism. This is much like what they would
have to do were they to practice in a new jurisdiction: they would have to learn new court
rules. Legal scholars must therefore familiarize themselves with how these principles
work and should be applied. Some likely already do and are therefore able to prevent, or
effectively respond to criticism by empirical scholars. It is important to note that Epstein
and King’s criticisms are the very same criticisms empirical scholars give one another
when the principles are not followed. Empirical scholars will also have to learn how to
develop mutually beneficial relationships with legal scholars who have not been trained
in empirical methodology and wish to do empirilegal research. They will have to learn
about legal language and culture in order to be effective in this role and avoid ruffling the
feathers of their esteemed counterparts in law.
Smoothing Ruffled Feathers
This “deeply flawed” discourse demonstrates how professional cultures can clash.
These authors all agree that an understanding of empirical methodology is useful. They
also agree on the value of the “rules” explicated by Epstein and King. This is an
excellent start. Even though neither side of the dialogue explicitly states that the
methodology used should be systematic in order to qualify as empirical, parties in both
disciplines recognize the great value of replicability. Replicability is the reason for
systematization. Research should be systematic so that external validity (a.k.a.
generalizability) is promoted making the conclusions reached applicable to more than just
one research sample. Systematic measurements or observations are likely more
dependable than haphazard ones and are certainly more replicable. Therefore, systematic
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methods lead to replicability making external validity more possible. This is a significant
point of agreement. Neither side addresses, though Revesz implies, that law does not
lend itself well to empirical investigation, at least not from a quantitative standpoint59.
Finally, none of the authors addresses the important role played by stark
differences between the cultures. The outcomes just examined would make it seem that
none of them recognized, or concerned themselves about, the potential for the kind of
conflict that erupted. The purpose of this paper was to attempt to lend perspective to the
debate by classifying it as a rocky start to a crucial dialogue. This is a dialogue that
scientific and legal scholars would both benefit from. It is also a dialogue that would
benefit society at large.
Richard Revesz provides the most diplomatic and most systematic of the three
responses to Epstein and King’s provocative paper. Furthermore, Revesz’ response is the
most hopeful. He notes that, “in their haste to show that legal academics have failed,
Epstein and King miss an important opportunity to explore the ways in which each
discipline can contribute to the other. In contrast, I hope that this Response can be a
catalyst for useful interdisciplinary interactions.”60
This author would like to think Revesz’s hope is widely shared. This paper was
written in an effort to expand upon that hope. It is therefore up to those of us in law, in
science, and especially those of us who are in both, to promote this dialogue and smooth
the feathers that inevitably get ruffled when two cultures collide.

59

A good example of this is attempts to measure a prosecutor’s performance. Should it be measure by
convictions? Does that measurement include plea bargains? Are political agendas controlled for? Should
supervisor ratings be used despite the literature indicating their poor reliability and validity? Should public
opinion be counted? Even all of these together could not provide an accurate picture of how well a
prosecutor performs his job, especially because of his range of discretion.
60
Supra note 50 , at 171.

24

